

Desarrollo Económico

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Mercados Laborales


En esta unidad estudiaremos:

- Efectos en empleo del salario mínimo (Chapter 4).
- Desafíos para el diseño de seguro de desempleo (Chapter 12)
- **Efectos de la inmigración en el mercado laboral (Chapter 4, Chapter 8)**
- Modelos de discriminación (Chapter 9)
- Desigualdad (Chapter 7, Chapter 5)

Labor Economics, Seventh Edition. Borjas, George.

Migración en Chile

Evolución 1980-2021



Migración en Chile

Origen de Migrantes en 2021


1.482.390

Personas migrantes viven en Chile: que corresponden al **7,5%*** de la población del país.

Estimación actualizada a Diciembre de 2021, entregada por el Departamento de Extranjería y Migración (DEM) y el Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE).


*El porcentaje que representa la población migrante en relación al total en 2021 se aproxima utilizando como total poblacional la proyección INE a 2022 con base al Censo 2017

POBLACIÓN MIGRANTE EN CHILE A 2021



Migración en Chile

Distribución de Migrantes por Región en 2021



Migración en Chile

Migrantes en Educación Escolar


EVOLUCIÓN DE CANTIDAD DE MATRÍCULA MIGRANTE EN SISTEMA ESCOLAR CHILENO Y PORCENTAJE QUE REPRESENTAN EN RELACIÓN AL TOTAL DE MATRÍCULA POR AÑO



Migración en Chile

Migrantes en Educación Superior

MATRÍCULA MIGRANTE EN EDUCACIÓN SUPERIOR



Migración

¿Por qué nos preocupa estudiar este fenómeno?

Desde la economía, tradicionalmente hemos estudiado la migración para entender sus efectos en:

- Mercados laborales: empleo, salarios, productividad.
- Presupuesto fiscal: servicios públicos, impuestos, beneficios.
- Crimen.
- Bienestar: no necesariamente vinculado a shocks económicos (cambios culturales, estructuras de barrios).

Los efectos pueden ser importantes tanto en el país de origen, como en el país de destino...


Para entender estos efectos vamos a tener que entender ¿cuáles son los determinantes de la migración? ¿quiénes migran?

Selección a migración

Modelo de Roy

Hay una distribución de habilidades en cada país. Vamos a decir que:

- Migrantes están seleccionados negativamente si vienen de la parte baja de la distribución.
- Migrantes están seleccionados positivamente si vienen de la parte alta de la distribución.




The distribution of skills in the source country gives the frequency of workers in each skill level. If immigrants have above-average skills, the immigrant flow is positively selected. If immigrants have below-average skills, the immigrant flow is negatively selected.

Selección a migración


Modelo de Roy

Si las habilidades son transferibles de un país a otro, el principal determinante de la migración van a ser los retornos económicos:

- Este modelo se abstrae de costos de migración.
- No es muy adecuado para estudiar migración por otros motivos (crisis democráticas, guerras, etc).



(a) Positive selection



(b) Negative selection

Selección a migración

Modelo de Roy

Este modelo nos permite estudiar de manera sencilla el impacto de *shock* económicos en la composición de los migrantes:


- ¿Cómo afecta el flujo migratorio un aumento en la tasa de impuestos al trabajo en el país de origen?
- ¿Cómo afecta el flujo migratorio un aumento del salario mínimo en el país de destino?

Efectos de migración en mercado laboral

<https://fb.watch/kjCVklGhbU/>

Efectos de la migración en el mercado laboral

- Efectos de la migración en el país de destino (Dustmann, Schonberg, and Stuhler, 2016)
- Efectos de la migración en el país de origen (Waldinger, 2010)




Labor supply shocks, native wages, and the adjustment of local employment

Dustmann, Schonberg, and Stuhler (2016)

Tras la caída de la cortina de hierro en 1991, Alemania impulsó una serie de reformas para ayudar a sus países vecinos:

- Permisos laborales a residentes de República Checa por dos años.
- Visas y permisos de residencia no se modificaron.
- Trabajadores checos tenían que volver a su país todos los días.



Labor supply shocks, native wages, and the adjustment of local employment

Dustmann, Schonberg, and Stuhler (2016)

TABLE I

CHARACTERISTICS OF TREATED, INLAND AND MATCHED CONTROL DISTRICTS IN 1989

	Border	West Germany	Control districts
Skill			
Low (no postsecondary education)	0.274	0.229	0.244
Medium (apprenticeship or equivalent)	0.695	0.703	0.723
High (university or college)	0.030	0.069	0.034
Age			
Below 30	0.434	0.351	0.420
30 to 49	0.410	0.454	0.412
50 and above	0.157	0.195	0.168
Female	0.411	0.401	0.414
Foreign	0.025	0.081	0.035
Mean log wages (censored)	3.881	4.055	3.879
Share censored	0.023	0.048	0.027
No. districts	13	327	24
No. workers	335,042	21,173,830	726,536

Note. The table compares average characteristics (weighted by employment level) of workers in eligible districts in the border region, in all other West-German districts and in matched control districts (see [Figure D](#) in 1989, one year prior to the immigration-induced labor supply shock. The wage variable refers to the average wage earned per day of the employment relationship and is right-censored at the social security limit.

Data Source: German Social Security Data, 1989.

Labor supply shocks, native wages, and the adjustment of local employment

Dustmann, Schonberg, and Stuhler (2016)




FIGURE II
Employment Shares of Czech nationals: Border vs Inland

Labor supply shocks, native wages, and the adjustment of local employment

Dustmann, Schonberg, and Stuhler (2016)




FIGURE III

Spatial Distribution of Czech Commuters in Border Region

Labor supply shocks, native wages, and the adjustment of local employment

Dustmann, Schonberg, and Stuhler (2016)




FIGURE IV
Aggregate Wage and Employment Effects

Labor supply shocks, native wages, and the adjustment of local employment

Dustmann, Schonberg, and Stuhler (2016)

TABLE IV
WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT BASELINE ESTIMATES BY SKILL, 1990–1993

		Wages	Employment
Panel A: All			
(i)	2SLS	−0.134 (0.047)	−0.926 (0.251)
(ii)	OLS	−0.058 (0.038)	−0.263 (0.184)
Panel B: Unskilled			
(i)	2SLS	−0.202 (0.048)	−1.371 (0.395)
(ii)	OLS	−0.094 (0.041)	−0.789 (0.215)
Panel C: Skilled			
(i)	2SLS	−0.106 (0.051)	−0.501 (0.214)
(ii)	OLS	−0.054 (0.025)	0.049 (0.196)
No. municipalities		1,550	1,550

Efectos de la migración en otros márgenes

Como hemos discutido en estas clases, la migración no sólo puede impactar los mercados laborales:


- Diversidad y satisfacción con el barrio (Langella and Manning, 2019)
- Crimen y percepción del crimen (Ajzenman, Domínguez and Undurraga, 2023)



Immigration, Crime, and Crime (Mis)Perceptions

Ajzenman et al. (2023)

Figure I. Immigrant inflows and the percentage of immigrants in Chile: 2005-2017



Immigration, Crime, and Crime (Mis)Perceptions

Ajzenman et al. (2023)

TABLE VI. 2017-2008 2SLS: Crime-related concerns

	Crime as a 1st or 2nd Concern	Crime as Impacting Pers.Life	Crime Affecting Qual-Life	Feeling Unsafe	Will be Victim	Principal Component Summary Index
Panel A. OLS Regressions						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	4.08 (1.68) [0.017]	5.39 (2.00) [0.008]	6.72 (2.09) [0.002]	6.27 (1.93) [0.002]	6.59 (2.61) [0.013]	5.84 (1.52) [0.000]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	36.08	34.87	63.15	17.39	43.83	39.42
Panel B. 2SLS Regressions						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	18.61 (6.79) [0.006]	14.94 (7.00) [0.033]	16.07 (6.67) [0.016]	4.79 (6.49) [0.460]	16.91 (8.92) [0.058]	13.58 (5.32) [0.011]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	36.08	34.87	63.15	17.39	43.83	39.42
First Stage Regressions						

Immigration, Crime, and Crime (Mis)Perceptions

Ajzenman et al. (2023)

TABLE VII. 2017-2008 2SLS: Beliefs about crime trends

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Crime is rising (neighborhood)		Crime is rising (municipality)		Crime is rising (country)	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (1)	IV (2)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	9.75 (2.57) [0.000]	13.44 (8.27) [0.104]	6.94 (2.38) [0.004]	8.74 (8.65) [0.312]	2.73 (1.19) [0.023]	1.71 (4.82) [0.722]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	42.10	42.10	64.86	64.86	78.91	78.91
First Stage Regression						
$\widehat{\Delta migr_{mt}}$		6.81 (1.64)		6.81 (1.64)		6.81 (1.64)
F-stat		17.35		17.35		17.35
Part. R^2		0.10		0.10		0.10

Immigration, Crime, and Crime (Mis)Perceptions

Ajzenman et al. (2023)

TABLE VIII. 2017-2008 2SLS: Crime-preventive behavioral reactions

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Investment in Home Security Index		Neighbors Security System Index		Owns a Weapon		Principal Component Summary Index	
	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (1)	IV (2)	OLS (1)	IV (2)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	1.84 (1.09) [0.093]	10.03 (4.70) [0.033]	0.80 (0.95) [0.399]	12.44 (4.06) [0.002]	0.45 (0.75) [0.548]	0.92 (1.62) [0.571]	1.38 (0.84) [0.104]	11.44 (4.04) [0.005]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	22.78	22.78	13.16	13.16	4.78	4.78	16.41	16.41
First Stage Regression								
$\widehat{\Delta migr}_{mt}$		6.81 (1.64)		6.81 (1.64)		6.81 (1.64)		6.81 (1.64)
F-stat		17.35		17.35		17.35		17.35
Part. R^2		0.10		0.10		0.10		0.10

Immigration, Crime, and Crime (Mis)Perceptions

Ajzenman et al. (2023)

TABLE IX. 2017-2008 2SLS: Victimization disaggregated

	Theft	Larceny	MV Theft	Burglary	Assault	Robbery	Total
Panel A. OLS Regressions							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	0.93 (1.07) [0.384]	-0.03 (0.73) [0.967]	0.34 (0.26) [0.196]	2.03 (0.64) [0.002]	0.05 (0.60) [0.934]	0.36 (0.66) [0.584]	3.03 (1.66) [0.072]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	8.45	4.57	0.77	4.75	1.87	4.43	21.46
Panel B. 2SLS Regressions							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	0.32 (3.56) [0.928]	-0.60 (2.95) [0.838]	-0.95 (0.71) [0.181]	1.13 (1.83) [0.538]	1.87 (1.59) [0.240]	3.09 (2.10) [0.141]	3.50 (5.21) [0.501]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	8.45	4.57	0.77	4.75	1.87	4.43	21.46

Immigration, Crime, and Crime (Mis)Perceptions

Ajzenman et al. (2023)


TABLE X. 2017-2008 2SLS: Homicides (in logs)

	Log Homicide Rate	Homicide Intensive Margin	Homicide Extensive Margin	Log Homicide Rate (Alleged Chilean perpetrator)	Log Homicide Rate (Alleged Foreign perpetrator)
Panel A. OLS Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	-0.23 (0.33) [0.497]	-0.06 (0.13) [0.613]	-0.14 (0.13) [0.304]	-0.14 (0.34) [0.685]	-0.05 (0.04) [0.272]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	3.58	0.41	0.09	2.25	0.05
Panel B. 2SLS Regressions					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta migr_{mt}$	0.85 (0.71) [0.233]	0.45 (0.40) [0.262]	-0.23 (0.21) [0.266]	1.06 (0.74) [0.151]	-0.10 (0.24) [0.663]
Observations	101	101	101	101	101
Mean DV	3.58	0.41	0.09	2.25	0.05

Diversity and Neighbourhood Satisfaction

Langella and Manning (2019)

Panel A. UK, 2011, Census Wards



Panel B. US, 2010, Census Tracts




Fig. 1. *Distribution of the Share of White People Across Small Areas. UK and US Comparison. Panel A:* UK, 2011, Census Wards. **Panel B:** US, 2010, Census Tracts

Diversity and Neighbourhood Satisfaction

Langella and Manning (2019)

Table 13. *Impact of the Ethnic Mix on Crime Perceptions, Results in Levels.*

	(1) No FE	(2) Individual FE	(3) Area FE	(4) Individual × Area FE	(5) Individual + Area FE
<i>OLS</i>					
White share	-0.075*** (0.023)	-0.178** (0.082)	-0.597*** (0.127)	-0.626*** (0.163)	-0.616*** (0.199)
N	74,738	35,807	70,345	28,821	33,716
	(1) No FE	(2) Individual FE	(3) Area FE	(4) Individual × Area FE	(5) Individual + Area FE
<i>IV</i>					
White share	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.262** (0.114)	-1.118*** (0.195)	-1.352*** (0.268)	-1.322*** (0.329)
N	73,612	35,002	69,275	28,260	32,978
KP	4414.965	1099.753	906.296	499.312	332.266

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA characteristics and time-fixed effects. See notes of Table 5. Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to 'Are you worried of being victim of a crime?' * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.001$.

Diversity and Neighbourhood Satisfaction

Langella and Manning (2019)

Table 15. *Ethnic Mix and Actual Crime Index.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	OLS—Area level controls	IV—Endogenous white share	IV—Endogenous unemployment and white share
% Unemployment	−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.005*** (0.001)	−0.103** (0.042)
% White	0.008*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.006)
% below age 16	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.009** (0.004)
% above age 65	0.010*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.002)
% of homeowners	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	−0.006*** (0.001)
% of social tenants	−0.009*** (0.001)	−0.009*** (0.001)	−0.001 (0.004)
Log of population	0.296*** (0.035)	0.290*** (0.036)	0.181*** (0.060)
% with no qualifications	−0.008*** (0.001)	−0.008*** (0.001)	−0.003 (0.003)
% with low qualifications	−0.010*** (0.002)	−0.009*** (0.002)	−0.015*** (0.003)
% with high qualifications	−0.011*** (0.001)	−0.010*** (0.001)	−0.002 (0.004)
Observations	129,921	129,921	129,921
R-squared	0.873	0.873	0.886

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All regressions take into account year and area-level fixed effects. All shares are in % terms. Regressions are at the LSOA level. The actual crime index is taken from the crime section of the Index of Multiple Deprivation for England; the dependent variable is the standardised rank version of it. Details on the Index of Multiple Deprivation are in Online Appendix A. * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.001$.

Diversity and Neighbourhood Satisfaction

Langella and Manning (2019)

Table 18. *Neighbourhood Satisfaction Production Function.*

	No FE			Individual FE			Area + Individual FE		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
White share		0.262*** (0.039)	0.120*** (0.034)		0.483*** (0.106)	0.410*** (0.100)		0.248 (0.189)	0.338** (0.144)
Social capital	0.010*** (0.002)		0.009*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)	− 0.000 (0.003)		− 0.001 (0.003)
Crime	− 0.067*** (0.003)		− 0.065*** (0.003)	− 0.058*** (0.005)		− 0.056*** (0.005)	− 0.031*** (0.005)		− 0.031*** (0.005)
Quality of local services	0.017*** (0.002)		0.017*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.004)		0.004 (0.004)	− 0.002 (0.003)		− 0.001 (0.003)
Social life	0.039*** (0.002)		0.038*** (0.002)	0.029*** (0.005)		0.028*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)		0.020*** (0.005)
Observations	20,242	20,238	20,118	13,374	13,374	13,374	11,747	11,747	11,747

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications) in parentheses. The full set of variables is not available for all years. The sample is therefore pooled to aggregate information for closest subsequent years for which information is available. See Online Appendix A for a description of the main variables and Table B2 for a description of the Principal Component Analysis used to construct the variables *Social Capital*, *Crime*, *Quality of local services*, and *Social life*. Indexes are standardised. Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to 'Do you like your neighbourhood?' * $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.001$.

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